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Abstract  
 
Using a unique dataset obtained from rural Andhra Pradesh, India that contains direct 
observations of household access to credit and detailed time use, results of this study indicate that 
credit market failures lead to a substantial reallocation of time used by children for activities such 
as schooling, household chores, remunerative work, and leisure. The negative effects of credit 
constraints on schooling amount to a 60% decrease of average schooling time. However, the 
magnitude of decrease due to credit constraints is about half that of the increase in both domestic 
and remunerative child labor, the other half appearing to come from a reduction in leisure. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Among the many market failures that stand in the way of economic development, the 
most pervasive may be those credit market failures which “impede the ability of the poor to make 
the private or collective ‘investments’ they need to escape poverty” (Banerjee, Benabou and 
Mookherjee 2006, xv). Given this, there has been a surge of interest in recent years in investigating 
the effects of credit market failures on education for children, the most important investment the 
poor can make. 
Most empirical studies in developing countries conclude that household access to credit 
markets has a significant effect on childhood education and on child labor. However, there appear 
to be two common limitations shared by most existing studies: First, datasets used in these studies 
do not have direct observations of access to credit markets by sample households. As a result, 
researchers have relied on various kinds of exogenous income shocks in order to infer effects of 
credit access (or relaxation of credit constraints) indirectly. Second, since data on comprehensive 
time use patterns of children are rarely available, many studies focus on either education (e.g. 
Jacoby 1994, Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; Sawada and Lokshin, 2009) or child labor (e.g. Beegle et 
al 2006). However, the effects of credit market failure on the reallocation of children’s time are 
likely to be seen in all activities including household chores and leisure as well as schooling and 
remunerative work. While it has often been assumed that an increase (decrease) in hours spent in 
child labor corresponds to a comparable decrease (increase) in schooling hours, recent studies have 
found that such a correspondence is far from one-to-one (Ravallion and Wodon 2000, Edmonds 
2006). These studies indicate that a major source of this imperfect substitution is likely to come 
from a reduction in leisure. However, the amount of time spent on leisure is not directly observed 
in these studies. As a result, existing research on the effects of credit access on schooling and/or 
child labor do not shed light on how credit access affects the burden of household production 
(relative to market work) on children’s time or leisure.  
To address this void, the present study utilizes a unique household survey dataset 
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collected in a rural part of the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh where the incidence of child labor is 
found to be relatively high. This dataset contains two special modules that are typically not 
available in large-scale multi-purpose household surveys: (1) time use and (2) credit access. The 
detailed time-use module records time allocation of all household members for various activities 
and allows critical distinctions to be made between aspects such as time spent on schooling, 
remunerative work, household chores, and leisure. In addition, the credit module contains detailed 
information on access to credit. This in turn allows distinctions to be made between 
credit-constrained and unconstrained households and also facilitates modeling the determination of 
credit market access explicitly. 
Previewing findings of the present study, results suggest that credit constraints lead to 
substantial reallocation of time use among children. Children in credit-constrained households tend 
to increase time allocated for both remunerative and domestic work. This in turn comes at the 
expense of time spent for schooling and leisure. This study shows that analyses of children’s time 
allocation focusing exclusively on remunerative work and schooling, ignoring domestic work or 
leisure, can underestimate the ill effects of credit constraints.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 includes a review of the 
existing literature related to credit constraints and education. The major features of the dataset used 
in this study are described in Section 3. Section 4 includes empirical specifications, and empirical 
results are provided in Section 5. Conclusions are discussed in Section 6. 
 
2. Identifying the Effects of Credit Access on Household Behavior: A Survey  
 
In the absence of data with direct observations of credit-constrained and unconstrained 
households, a conventional approach to incorporating credit constraints in empirical models is to 
split the sample into those who are likely to be credit-constrained and those who are not (Zeldes 
1989; Morduch 1990). This exogenous approach, however, has two potential problems: First, it is 
unlikely that a single variable such as the income-wealth ratio or land ownership is a sufficient 
predictor of consumer abilities to borrow (Garcia et al 1997, p.158; Jappelli 1990). Second, credit 
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constraint is endogenously generated; thus estimation results will likely suffer from endogeneity 
bias (Scott, 2000). 
 Recent empirical studies have recognized these potential issues and have relied on a 
variety of exogenous shocks to infer effects of credit constraints on household behavior. One 
approach utilizes transitory productivity shocks. The identification assumption is that a measured 
productivity shock generates a shift in the credit entitlement of households but is uncorrelated with 
household unobservables. For example, Beegle et al (2006) use self-reported crop shocks to 
identify the effects of credit constraints on child labor. However, one potential issue with their 
approach is that it mixes wealth and substitution effects. A productivity shock changes household 
shadow prices which define wealth and substitution effects. A negative farm productivity shock 
decreases the demand for farm production inputs while the wealth effect can increase the labor 
supply to farming if the outside labor opportunity is limited. This seems to be the case in the study 
region of Beegle et al where “the use of wage labor is very limited” (p.81). What this approach 
identifies may thus not be the effect of credit constraint, which is the marginal utility value of 
current wealth relative to the future, but the combined effect of price changes and ensuing wealth 
changes.  
 Edmonds (2006) exploits a pension policy change in South Africa. The idea is that a 
previously unanticipated wealth transfer program will shift credit entitlement of households but is 
uncorrelated with household unobservables. Edmonds (2006) uses a regression discontinuity 
design to deal with the endogeneity of pension eligibility. By controlling for household 
characteristics, especially age of elderly members, his estimation exploits a discrete jump in 
pension eligibility among observationally proximate households with elderly members. The size of 
transfer changes the wealth position considerably and affects the household schooling choice. 
While attractive, one of the major limitations of the “unanticipated shock” approach is that such 
events (or natural experiments more generally) do not occur very frequently.1  
 
1 There are a few additional issues in interpreting Edmond’s results: First, the study yields an estimate of 
local effects limited to the neighborhood where the discrete jump occurs. Second, the study does not 
distinguish between consumptive demand of schooling and “investive” demand, as it measures the effect of 
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 Attanasio et al (2008) use data on car loans and note that credit-constrained individuals 
exhibit a larger response to longer maturity. This is because extension of maturity effectively 
increases the credit limit while its impact on repayment burden is of second-order. While this novel 
approach has merit, it has limited applicability to less developed countries where formal loans for 
the purchase of consumer durables are less prevalent and non-standardized.  
 Another distinct approach is experimental and taken by Karlan and Zinman (2006). In 
this approach, credit entitlement is randomly assigned to households. This is by far the cleanest 
way to examine the effect of credit constraint on household choices. However, despite the obvious 
attractions of natural and prospective experimental approaches, their validity critically depends on 
specific locations and the contexts that make such experiments feasible. Unfortunately, in the 
setting of child labor and time allocation in rural India, the availability of such opportunities 
appears to be relatively limited. This paper alternatively seeks to enhance the non-experimental 
approach by collecting richer data. As described in the next section, a household survey 
questionnaire was designed to allow direct identification of credit entitlement following Scott 
(2000). This resolves the issue of the substitution effect mixture. For addressing the potential 
endogeneity issues regarding household access to credit, an instrumental variables approach was 
used. This is similar in spirit to Beegle et al (2006).  
 
3. Data 
 
3.1. The Household Survey in Rural Andhra Pradesh, India 
 
Approximately 400 rural households in 32 villages in the Kurnool district of the southern 
Indian state of Andhra Pradesh were surveyed2. This study region belongs to the semi-arid tropics 
of the Deccan Plateau and is notorious for high risk in agricultural production (Walker and Ryan 
 
an exogenous wealth increase.  
2 Households were randomly selected using a variable probability sampling method in order to collect a 
sufficient number of households containing child labor. In the statistical and econometric analyses of this 
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1990). The survey was conducted in February-March 2005. While this period is usually 
characterized by an abundant demand for agricultural labor, this particular year was marked with a 
drought which resulted in lower demand for farm labor. Nevertheless, numerous instances of child 
labor were observed. Indian states are generally very large geographically and exhibit great 
variation in the level of social development. Thus, peripheral state border areas where the outreach 
of administrative power is limited are known to accommodate a higher incidence of child labor. 
This is true even in relatively developed states such as Andhra Pradesh. 
For these reasons, the dataset contains sample households with a higher incidence of 
child labor than found in other data sources originating in India. For example, at the “all India 
level” (NSS dataset 1999/2000), the child labor incidence ratio among children aged 10-14 was 
12.5% when a wider definition of child labor including household chores was used (Edmonds et al 
2005). In UP and Bihar (LSMS dataset 1997/98), where income poverty has been more severe than 
in other regions of India, the child labor incidence ratio was reported to be around 28.3 percent 
(Sakamoto 2006). The corresponding figure for the sample used in this study was 54.2 percent 
(Kurosaki et al 2006).  
 
3.2. Time Allocation of Children  
 
The survey contains a “one week time use module” whose reference period is the seven 
days immediately prior to the interview date. Respondents were asked about their activity on each 
“half-day” (AM or PM) during the reference period. A total of 14 half-days were classified as 
belonging to the following categories: (1) Remunerated work, including labor on own 
farm/enterprise, (2) Non-remunerated work, (3) Household chores, (4) Child care, (5) Schooling, 
including time spent on homework, (6)Social activities, (7) Leisure, (8)Sickness, and (9) Other.   
Adopting the ILO Standards classification, children in age group 5-14 are covered in this 
paper. Table 1 summarizes the one week time use data for 876 children aged 5-14 included in the 
sample households. For empirical analysis, the nine activity groups were aggregated into four 
 
paper, differences in sampling probability were corrected by weighting. See Fuwa et al (2006a) for details. 
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broader categories: (1) schooling (category 5), (2) household chores including child care (category 
3 & 4), (3) remunerative work (category 1), and (4) leisure (category 7). Child time use in each 
activity is measured as the number of half-days spent on that activity during the reference period. 
Thus, each variable takes on integer values between 0 and 14.  
Table 1 summarizes the overall pattern of time used by children in the sample for various 
activities. Despite the relatively high incidence of child labor in the study area, children in the 
sample devote the largest proportion (nearly one third on average) of their time to schooling. After 
schooling, the bulk of their time is split equally between remunerative work and leisure. Each of 
these activities accounts for approximately one quarter of time allocation. The time devoted to 
household chores (as a main activity at least) accounts for a relatively smaller amount (one tenth) 
of their time. While information/data on child schooling and remunerative work is widely available, 
data on child domestic work and leisure are less commonly available. However, a substantial share 
(38%) of time used by children in the study sample is devoted to those two types of activities. Thus, 
ignoring time spent for those activities may potentially lead to erroneous inferences regarding the 
way children allocate their time (for example, between schooling and remunerative work). 
  
3.3. Credit Constraints  
 
As discussed in Section 2, the credit module was designed to identify credit-constrained 
households directly as suggested by Scott (2000). In identifying credit constraints, household 
heads were asked about member experience with credit suppliers during the 12 months prior to the 
survey. To construct liquidity constraint indicators with sufficient variation across households, 
concentration was placed on formal credit sources. A clear division between credit-constrained and 
unconstrained households is likely to emerge in the context of bank or formal credit in the study 
region (Pender 1996) because access is often determined by the household’s ability to provide 
collateral, and this generally depends on ownership of land title. Conversely, informal credit comes 
in numerous forms, so it is difficult to classify households according to credit access, and the 
determinants of access are less clear cut. Further, over the last few decades, formal sources of 
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finance have become more accessible and important to the village economy in the study area. 
Given the increasing importance of formal credit, its impact on household behavior is interesting 
in itself. 
Whether or not a household had tried to obtain a loan in a particular period was used to 
identify credit-constrained households. For those who tried to borrow money, it was determined 
whether or not a household could borrow as much as they requested under the proposed conditions. 
If the answer was yes, the household was identified as unconstrained. Those households who had 
their loan applications rejected or who could not borrow sufficiently were identified as 
credit-constrained. 
Those who did not try to borrow were further asked the reasons for not seeking a bank 
loan. The answer choices were: (1) No need for credit, (2) Not want to be in debt, (3) Terms are not 
attractive (too short duration, too high interest rate, etc.), (4) Too much paperwork, (5) Live too 
far from lender, (6) Already have large amount of debt, (7) Believed I would be refused by lender, 
(8) Don't know how to get credit/Not know lender, (9) Don't know anyone who can be guarantor, 
and (10) Other. 
Respondents who chose one of (3) through (9) were identified as households likely to be 
credit-constrained with regard to formal sources. The remaining respondents who did not try to 
borrow were considered to be unconstrained. This is a “broad definition of credit constraint.” 
However, respondents who chose one of (3) through (5) might not in fact be credit-constrained. 
Thus, an indicator variable was defined under the “narrow definition of credit constraint.” This 
identified those households choosing one of (6) through (9) as constrained3. This narrow definition 
of credit constraint is the focus in subsequent empirical analysis4. On the basis of these responses, 
credit-constrained households who were not able to access credit can be identified5. Since almost 
 
3 This “narrow definition” is broadly compatible with the “weaker definition” of credit constraint in 
Attanasio et al (2008). Their “weaker definition” refers to the gap in lending and borrowing rates, and 
options (3) through (5) in this study are transaction costs that increase it.  
4 Results of empirical analysis based on the wider definition of credit constraints are broadly similar to what 
is reported here.  
5 This direct inference approach cannot identify constrained households who are not in need of credit 
through, for example, experiencing a positive income shock. However, this limitation would also be found in 
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none of the existing multi-purpose household surveys include direct questions that identify credit 
constraints (Scott 2000), the data set provides valuable direct information for separating 
constrained and unconstrained households.  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all 331 households used in this study. Among 
these, 164 (49.5 percent) are identified as credit-constrained (under the narrower definition), and 
this indicates that a significant proportion of households are indeed credit-constrained6. While age 
and education profiles of the constrained and unconstrained households appear to be quite similar, 
the average household size is smaller, the average value of land owned is larger, and the average 
per capita consumption is higher among unconstrained households. The difference, however, is 
statistically significant only in the case of average household size.  
Table 2 also summarizes time use patterns of children by contrasting credit-constrained 
and unconstrained households. Children’s time allocation patterns are quite similar between 
credit-constrained and unconstrained households. Children in credit-constrained households, 
however, tend to allocate more time to household chores, and the difference is marginally 
significant with a p-value of 10%. This observation is consistent with the findings of Sawada et al 
(2006) and the possibility that mothers tend to work longer in credit-constrained households, and 
the burden of domestic work is shouldered in turn (at least in part) by their children. While the 
estimated mean amount of time spent on schooling, household chores, and leisure are all slightly 
less among children within credit-constrained households, the differences are not statistically 
significant. The next section includes investigation of whether or not these observations based on 
bivariate comparison hold when other factors are controlled.  
 
4. The Econometric Specification  
 
How does credit access affect time allocation among children? In order to implement an 
 
an experimental study in which the experimenter offers credit at random. 
6 Based on the “wider definition” of credit constraint, 205 households (61.9 percent of the total) are 
identified as credit-constrained.  
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empirical assessment of this question, the conditional demand function approach of Pollak (1969) 
and Pitt (1997) is applied as follows:  
 
Lhij = α0j+ Xhi’α1j + Xh’α2j + αccjcch + uhij      (1) 
 
where Lhij is the amount of time spent on activity j by child i in household h, cch is an endogenous 
dummy variable (defined at the household level) indicating whether the household is 
credit-constrained (cc=1) or not (cc=0). Xhi and Xh are vectors of child and household 
characteristics respectively and represent the shifters of market returns to child labor and schooling, 
the interest rate, and preferences. uhi is a mean-zero error term. To control for differences in local 
market conditions and preferences, village fixed effects and community fixed effects are also 
included. Assuming that the effects of all covariates Xhi and Xh are the same between 
credit-constrained and unconstrained households, the coefficient αccj measures how the lack of 
access to credit affects time spent on various activities (j) by children. Household access to credit 
is determined by: 
 
cch = 1[Xh’β1 + β2Kh + eh>0]       (2) 
 
where 1[•] is an indicator function associated with credit constraint. Kh is the exogenous shifter of 
the amount of credit to which that household h has access, and eh is a mean-zero error term which 
may be correlated with uhij. The observed measure of Kh used in empirical implementation is the 
value of land held by household h. This identifying assumption or exclusion restriction follows 
Sawada et al (2006). They argue that the value of land owned by each household affects credit 
access, for example, through collateral value. However, it does not directly affect time allocation 
patterns of household members once the labor demand factor is controlled for using the physical 
size of irrigated land operated by the household as a determinant of time allocation. Following 
Angrist (2001), equations (1) and (2) were estimated by two-stage least squares with the value of 
owned land as the identifying instrument.  
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In estimating equation (1), the following types of control variables were employed: (1) 
individual characteristics of a child, (2) conventional household characteristics, (3) potential 
shifters of household preferences, and (4) village fixed effects. Their constituents are described 
below. 
First, individual characteristics of a child include the child’s age, a quadratic term to 
capture non-linearity of the age effect, defined as (age - 5)2, and a dummy variable taking a value 
of one for girls. 
Second, conventional household characteristics include the age of the household head (to 
control for the lifecycle effect), the years of schooling for the child’s father, the years of schooling 
for the child’s mother, their cross terms with the girl dummy variable to investigate the gender 
disparity among children, the number of household members, household composition variables 
(shares of various age-gender groups within the household membership: working-age males, 
working-age females, male children of age 5-14, female children of age 5-14, and children of age 
0-4), a dummy variable for holders of ration cards given to below-poverty line households under 
the Public Distribution System of the Government of India, the acreage of irrigated land operated 
by the household, the number of bullocks owned by the household to represent livestock assets, 
and dummy variables for mutually exclusive community groupings based on religion and wider 
caste definitions (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, upper and medium Hindu castes, and 
Muslim, with the reference category defined as those households belonging to the so-called “Other 
Backward Classes”) 
Third, potential shifters of household preferences are defined as variables that may 
influence household preferences via the process of bargaining over intra-household resource 
allocation. These include a dummy variable for literacy of the father of the household head, a 
dummy variable for literacy of the mother of the household head, a dummy variable for literacy of 
the father of the spouse of the household head, a dummy variable for literacy of the mother of the 
spouse of the household head, the difference in age between the father and the mother of the 
household head, and the difference in age between the father and the mother of the spouse of the 
household head. As McElroy (1990) argued, such extra-household environmental parameters 
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(EEP) are likely to enter into reduced-form demand functions if preferences of men and women 
differ and if their “bargaining power” is likely to be affected by such factors7. 
Finally, village fixed effects are included in the estimation to collectively control for 
differences in market conditions, environments, and school quality. In India, it is often claimed that 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are backward strata with less interest in education. If this 
is correct, the coefficients on their respective dummy variables would be expected to be positive in 
the equation for child labor and negative in that for schooling. Whether or not this holds even 
when other individual and household characteristics are controlled can be examined. The inclusion 
of community dummies (or more detailed caste fixed effects) may be expected to reduce possible 
bias due to omitted variables at the household level. 
 
5. Empirical Results  
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics of empirical variables, and Table 4 includes 
estimation results. Each column of Table 4 corresponds to a separate regression with each 
dependent “time spent on” variable: schooling, household chores and child care, remunerative 
work, and leisure. Regressions are based on a two stage least squares estimation and are 
accompanied by Huber-White robust standard errors8. Village and community dummies are also 
included, but for brevity, the coefficients on village fixed effects are not reported. 
First stage regression results for the determinants of credit constraint, based on a linear 
probability model of Angrist (2001), are shown in Appendix Table 1.9 Among the explanatory 
 
7 Alternative models of household decision making have been explicitly tested (for example, “unitary” 
versus “collective” models) with the same dataset in Fuwa et al (2006b).  
8 Since the dependent variables are restricted to values between 0 and 14, an obvious alternative estimation 
method would be tobit estimation in order to handle censoring. As Deaton (1997, 85-89) has shown, 
however, when heteroskedasticity and censoring are present, tobit estimation does not necessarily perform 
better than OLS. Given this, 2SLS was used in this study.  
9 One potential drawback of linear probability models is the possibility of predicted probabilities that are out 
of the 0-1 range. In this model, the maximum and minimum predicted values are 1.12 and -0.20, respectively. 
The total number of observations with out-of-range predicted values was not large (only 19 out of a total of 
660 or about 3%). 
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variables, the market value of land owned by the household has a significantly negative coefficient, 
and the number of household members has a significantly positive coefficient. Households with 
fewer land assets and more household members are more likely to be under a binding credit 
constraint. Household demographic compositions also have significant coefficients.  
Table 4 includes summaries of the estimation results of equation (1). These regressions 
explain child time allocation with endogenous credit constraint as well as other individual and 
household-level characteristics, community dummies, and village dummies as explanatory 
variables. Of particular interest are the effects of household access to credit on the amount of time 
children allocate to various activities (αccj in equation (1)). Credit constraints tend to reduce the 
time children spend on schooling and leisure and to increase time spent on domestic and 
remunerative work. In line with the conventional wisdom of the literature, credit constraints 
significantly reduce schooling time for children (p-value = 5.6%). With all else equal, the time 
spent on schooling by a child in a credit-constrained household is shorter by 1.4 days (2.9 half day 
units) over the one-week reference period compared to that of a child in an unconstrained 
household. The quantitative magnitude appears to be quite substantial, approximately 60% of 
average schooling time. Credit constraints also reduce  leisure time for children by about 2.1 days 
(4.3 half day units), and such effects are statistically significant (at 4%). At the same time, children 
in credit-constrained households tend to spend significantly longer (p-value = 3%) time on 
domestic work (household chores including childcare) by roughly 1.6 days (3.3 half day units). 
Children in credit-constrained households tend to spend longer hours in remunerative work, also 
by 1.6 days (3.2 half day units). However, since the estimated standard error for the latter 
coefficient is somewhat larger, it is only marginally (19%) significant. 
Although the coefficient of the credit constraint variable in the equation for remunerative 
work is not statistically significant at a conventional level of significance, the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients suggests that the increase in total time spent for work, both domestic and 
remunerative (6.5 half day units), appears to match the amount of decrease in time spent for 
schooling and leisure (7.2 half day units). Thus, credit constraints appear to have significant effects 
on all aspects of the time allocation of children. These results are broadly consistent with recent 
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empirical literature concerned with the relation between credit constraints and education (see for 
example Edmonds 2006, Jacoby 1994, Jacoby and Skoufias 1997, Sawada and Lokshin 2009). 
Findings in this study thus suggest that children in credit-constrained households increase their 
labor supply both for domestic work and for remunerative work (although the evidence for the 
latter is weaker).  
Further, compatible with findings of Ravallion and Wodon (2000), the amount of 
decrease in schooling and increase in labor appear not to be symmetric. Ravallion and Wodon 
(2000) found that the increase in incidence of schooling due to the school stipend program was 
larger than the decrease in incidence of child labor (including both market and domestic work) by 
a factor of four (for boys) to eight (for girls). Point estimates in the present study indicate a 
somewhat smaller magnitude of asymmetry. The amount of increase in child labor (household 
chores and remunerative work) due to credit constraint (6.5 half-day units) is twice as large as the 
decrease in schooling (2.9 half-day units). In addition, data indicate that such a gap between the 
increase in child labor and the decrease in schooling is filled at the expense of leisure. 
Results of this study demonstrate that bivariate comparisons such as those in Table 2 may 
fail to reveal some significant differences with far-reaching implications. While time allocation 
patterns of children are not significantly different between credit constrained and unconstrained 
households (with the exception of the difference in time allocated for domestic work), regression 
results reveal that the impact of credit entitlement is in fact quite significant when the effects of 
other variables (and the endogeneity of credit constraints) are controlled. Finally, first-stage results 
indicate that the size and structure of the household combined with the value of owned land and 
village fixed effects determine household credit entitlement. 
Evidence indicates that there are significant gender gaps in child time allocation, even 
after controlling for (observable) household-level and individual-level characteristics. Compared 
with boys, time spent by girls on schooling and leisure is significantly shorter, while their time 
spent on household chores is significantly longer. The gender difference in time allocated for 
remunerative work, however, is not significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.29). The age 
effect on remunerative work is linearly positive while it is concave on schooling and convex on 
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leisure. Despite conventional findings in empirical studies on India (Aggarwal 2004, Basu et al. 
2003, Deb and Rosati 2002, Drèze and Kingdon 2001, Sakamoto 2006), the effects of parental 
education on child time allocation (including that on schooling) are surprisingly found to be 
generally insignificant. The only exception is the effect of maternal education on household chores. 
Better educated mothers tend to narrow the gender gap among children in time allocation to this 
activity. The general insignificance of the coefficient estimates for parental education may be due 
in part to the presence of variables capturing the education of grandparents. This is often found to 
be inter-generationally correlated. The literacy of the father of the household head, for example, is 
found to have significantly positive effects on schooling time for his grandchildren and negative 
effects on time allocated by his grandchildren for remunerative work. Among other household 
characteristics, the number of household members has a negative effect on remunerative work and 
a positive effect on leisure.  
Effects of community dummies remain even after controlling for individual and 
household characteristics and village fixed effects. In the remunerative work regression, the 
coefficients for Scheduled Tribes, upper and medium Hindu castes, and Muslim are negative and 
statistically significant. This implies that households belonging to these groups are less likely to 
send children to remunerated work than households belonging to “Other Backward Classes.” In the 
schooling regression, the coefficients for Scheduled Castes, upper and medium Hindu castes, and 
Muslim are positive and statistically significant. While the positive coefficient found for the upper 
and medium Hindu castes coincides with expectations, the finding that Muslim households are also 
more likely to send children to school (than households belonging to “Other Backward Classes”) is 
again in contrast with the findings of Deb and Rosati (2002), Drèze and Kingdon (2001), Aggarwal 
(2004), and Sakamoto (2006). This may reflect the impact of civil movements in rural Andhra 
Pradesh to improve the social conditions of households belonging to the Scheduled Caste, 
Scheduled Tribe, and Muslim communities.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Using a unique data set exclusively collected in rural India, this paper presents results 
compatible with existing theoretical literature such as Galor and Zeira (1993) showing that credit 
market failure can be a significant factor preventing the poor from investing in childhood 
education. While such an inference is not necessarily new in the empirical literature, findings in 
this study are based on direct observations of household credit market access rather than indirect 
inference based on particular theoretical propositions. The quantitative magnitude of the negative 
effects of credit market failures is substantial (60% of the average schooling time) in the part of 
India where the survey was conducted.  
Credit market failures appear to result in substantial reallocation of the use of time by 
children in all activities (including schooling). The magnitude of the decrease in schooling due to 
credit constraints is about half the amount of increase in child labor (including both remunerative 
and domestic work, which increase in similar magnitudes). The other half comes from the 
reduction in leisure. Results suggest that the direct cost of increased child labor due to credit 
market failures is thus not only lost time in schooling but also leisure time. While there is little in 
the data that shows the ultimate consequences of reduction in leisure, it may include lost time in 
homework or afterschool activities which may lead to the widely-discussed underachievement of 
primary school graduates in India. As Ravallion and Wodon (2000) note, the impact of credit 
constraint may be underestimated if reduction in leisure time is not considered. 
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Table 1: Time Use of Children in Sample Households, Andhra Pradesh, India, 2005 
 
Activity Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Schooling 876 4.469 5.004 0 14 
Household chores and 
child care 876 1.409 3.642 0 14 
Remunerative work 876 3.594 5.602 0 14 
Leisure 876 3.868 4.498 0 14 
Notes: The sum of means across the four activity categories is not 14 due to a residual category which 
includes social activities, being sick, and “other activities.”  
 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of the Sample Households by Credit Constraint Status  
  
Credit 
Constraint 
Not Binding
Under 
Binding 
Credit 
Constraint 
t-statistic 
(for the 
same 
mean) 
Household-Level Characteristics        
No. of observations 167 164  
Age of the household head 44.263 44.610 -0.290 
(0.834) (0.854) [0.772] 
Schooling years of the household head 1.832 1.628 0.584 
(0.253) (0.241) [0.560] 
Schooling years of the household head's spouse 0.623 0.579 0.210 
(0.143) (0.150) [0.834] 
Number of household members 7.162 8.012 -2.052 
(0.213) (0.358) [0.041] 
Value of land owned by the household in 100,000 
Rupees 
1.240 0.829 1.223 
(0.314) (0.113) [0.222] 
Per capita consumption per week in Rupees 145.693 136.167 0.578 
(9.988) (13.167) [0.564] 
Children’s Use of Time     
No. of observations 413 389  
Schooling 4.569 4.486 0.234 
(4.905) (5.149) [0.815] 
Household chores and child care 1.228 1.650 1.634 
(3.470) (3.857) [0.103] 
Remunerative work 3.663 3.401 0.664 
(5.728) (5.450) [0.507] 
Leisure 3.903 3.776 0.465 
(4.328) (4.645) [0.642] 
Notes: Numbers above show averages or t-statistics. Numbers in parentheses and brackets below show 
respectively standard deviations and p-values. Credit constraint status is based on the “narrow 
definition” described in section 3.3. 
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Table 3: Definition and Summary Statistics of Variables  
Variable Definition (Unit) No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Endogenous Variables, Child-Level      
Time spent on schooling (half-days) 876 4.469 5.004 0 14 
Time spent on household chores and child care 
(half-days) 876 1.409 3.642 0 14 
Time spent on remunerative work (half-days) 876 3.594 5.602 0 14 
Leisure time (half-days) 876 3.868 4.498 0 14 
      
Exogenous Variables, Child-Level      
Age (years) 887 10.108 2.704 5 14 
Age squared ( (Age-5)2 ) 887 33.397 26.956 0 81 
Girl 887 0.499 dummy 0 1 
      
Endogenous Variables, Household-Level      
Credit constraint (broad definition) 810 0.600 dummy 0 1 
Credit constraint (narrow definition) 810 0.488 dummy 0 1 
      
Exogenous Variables, Household-Level      
Age of household head (years) 887 44.599 11.145 20 82 
Schooling of child’s father (years) 750 1.756 3.256 0 16 
Schooling of child’s mother (years) 839 0.547 1.669 0 14 
Number of household members 887 7.773 3.772 3 29 
Share of adult males (15-60) (%) 887 23.626 10.756 0 66.7 
Share of adult females (15-60) (%) 887 21.890 9.183 0 66.7 
Share of boys (5-14) (%) 887 21.572 13.526 0 66.7 
Share of girls (5-14) (%) 887 22.011 14.851 0 75 
Share of infants (0-4) (%) 887 5.516 8.648 0 37.5 
Value of land owned by the household   
(100,000 Rupees) 887 0.981 3.176 0 48 
Acreage of irrigated land operated by the 
household (acres) 887 3.256 22.342 0 500 
Number of bullocks owned by the household 887 0.838 1.009 0 4 
Holder of ration card for Below- Poverty-Line 
(BPL) households 901 0.754 dummy 0 1 
Literacy of father of household head 816 0.256 dummy 0 1 
Literacy of mother of household head 817 0.021 dummy 0 1 
Literacy of father of household head’s spouse 841 0.227 dummy 0 1 
Literacy of mother of household head’s spouse 840 0.010 dummy 0 1 
Age difference among parents of household head 
(years) 817 5.168 4.979 0 30 
Age difference among parents of household 
head’s spouse (years) 828 4.670 4.555 0 25 
Other Backward Classes (reference) 883 0.685 dummy 0 1 
Scheduled Castes 883 0.202 dummy 0 1 
Scheduled Tribes 883 0.032 dummy 0 1 
Upper and medium Hindu castes 883 0.041 dummy 0 1 
Muslim 883 0.029 dummy 0 1 
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Table 4: 2SLS Results Summary 
Right-hand Side Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Schooling Household chores and child care 
Remunerative 
work Leisure 
Credit constraint -2.873* 3.298** 3.237 -4.257** 
(narrow definition) (1.503) (1.557) (2.429) (2.047) 
 [0.056] [0.034] [0.183] [0.038] 
Age 0.342 0.418** 1.109*** -2.035*** 
 (0.264) (0.202) (0.273) (0.265) 
 [0.196] [0.038] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age squared -0.092*** -0.012 -0.016 0.133*** 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.030) (0.026) 
 [0.000] [0.570] [0.595] [0.000] 
Girl -1.956*** 2.774*** 0.625 -1.593*** 
 (0.449) (0.441) (0.589) (0.524) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.289] [0.002] 
Age of household head 0.019 -0.009 0.015 0.022 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) 
 [0.369] [0.686] [0.551] [0.299] 
Schooling of child’s -0.097 0.124 0.055 0.091 
father (0.104) (0.078) (0.136) (0.110) 
 [0.351] [0.110] [0.683] [0.405] 
Schooling of child’s 0.041 0.026 -0.210 0.096 
father * Girl (0.114) (0.136) (0.171) (0.137) 
 [0.723] [0.847] [0.219] [0.480] 
Schooling of child’s 0.166 0.214* -0.252 -0.072 
mother (0.247) (0.112) (0.192) (0.207) 
 [0.503] [0.057] [0.191] [0.727] 
Schooling of child’s 0.157 -0.346** 0.102 0.119 
mother * Girl (0.265) (0.159) (0.234) (0.237) 
 [0.552] [0.029] [0.664] [0.617] 
No. of household  0.076 -0.047 -0.185** 0.170** 
members (0.059) (0.061) (0.085) (0.073) 
 [0.197] [0.444] [0.030] [0.020] 
Share of adult males 0.004 0.004 0.011 -0.020 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.045) (0.036) 
 [0.898] [0.903] [0.799] [0.570] 
Share of adult females -0.025 -0.004 -0.038 0.056 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.044) (0.038) 
 [0.426] [0.903] [0.379] [0.133] 
Share of boys 0.021 0.017 -0.025 -0.017 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.045) (0.040) 
 [0.533] [0.596] [0.589] [0.670] 
Share of girls 0.002 0.004 -0.012 -0.002 
 (0.031) (0.028) (0.041) (0.035) 
 [0.955] [0.888] [0.764] [0.962] 
Share of infants 0.021 0.056 -0.026 -0.056 
 (0.037) (0.049) (0.054) (0.044) 
 [0.559] [0.249] [0.634] [0.203] 
Acreage of irrigated land 0.050 0.000 -0.064 0.041 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.053) (0.045) 
 [0.176] [0.999] [0.233] [0.360] 
Number of bullocks owned 0.216 -0.011 0.281 -0.554** 
 (0.233) (0.245) (0.275) (0.235) 
 [0.354] [0.964] [0.308] [0.018] 
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Table 4 (continued): 2SLS Results Summary 
Right-hand Side Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Schooling Household chores and child care 
Remunerative 
work Leisure 
Holder of ration card 0.725 0.627 -1.344** 0.028 
 (0.524) (0.514) (0.613) (0.541) 
 [0.166] [0.223] [0.029] [0.959] 
Literacy of father of 2.294*** 0.435 -2.151*** -0.353 
household head (0.496) (0.510) (0.622) (0.478) 
 [0.000] [0.393] [0.001] [0.460] 
Literacy of mother of -3.400* 1.036 -0.294 0.542 
household head (1.857) (1.520) (1.209) (1.133) 
 [0.067] [0.496] [0.808] [0.632] 
Literacy of father of 0.943* -1.356*** -0.569 0.781 
household head’s spouse (0.502) (0.431) (0.612) (0.510) 
 [0.061] [0.002] [0.353] [0.125] 
Literacy of mother of -1.684 1.818 3.571*** -3.281*** 
household head’s spouse (1.607) (1.509) (1.227) (1.129) 
 [0.295] [0.228] [0.004] [0.004] 
Age difference among parents -0.113* 0.010 0.117* -0.009 
of household head (0.055) (0.052) (0.066) (0.056) 
 [0.038] [0.848] [0.076] [0.875] 
Age difference among parents 0.125** -0.012 -0.021 -0.100* 
of household head’s spouse (0.054) (0.054) (0.062) (0.056) 
 [0.022] [0.825] [0.736] [0.075] 
Scheduled Castes 1.170* -0.959 -1.109 1.250* 
 (0.630) (0.596) (0.818) (0.729) 
 [0.063] [0.108] [0.175] [0.087] 
Scheduled Tribes 0.034 1.729* -4.418** 3.154* 
 (1.472) (1.047) (2.065) (1.755) 
 [0.982] [0.099] [0.032] [0.072] 
Upper and medium Hindu 2.163** -1.169 -3.961*** 2.694* 
castes (1.024) (1.087) (1.237) (1.610) 
 [0.035] [0.283] [0.001] [0.094] 
Muslim 3.413*** 0.065 -3.113** -0.269 
 (1.187) (1.240) (1.328) (1.186) 
 [0.004] [0.958] [0.019] [0.821] 
No. of observations 660 660 660 660 
R2 0.316 0.162 0.268 0.248 
F 9.616 2.097 6.111 6.528 
 
Notes (1) The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
(2) Standard errors and p-values are respectively in parentheses and square brackets.  
(3) “Credit constraint” is an endogenous variable. Models include all explanatory variables defined in 
Table 3 except for “Value of owned land” which is excluded for identification purposes. 
(4) Village fixed effects are also included, but coefficients are not reported.  
(5) Weighted linear models are estimated to correct for the difference in sampling probability. 
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Appendix Table 1. First-Stage Regression Results of the Linear Probability Model: 
Determinants of Binding Credit Constraints 
 
Dependent Variable = Credit constraint (narrow definition) 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Age -0.027 0.026 
Age squared 0.003 0.003 
Girl -0.045 0.049 
Age of household head -0.002 0.002 
Schooling of child’s father -0.020* 0.011 
Schooling of child’s father * Girl 0.027* 0.014 
Schooling of child’s mother -0.006 0.027 
Schooling of child’s mother * Girl 0.009 0.030 
No. of household members 0.019*** 0.006 
Share of adult males 0.007* 0.004 
Share of adult females 0.008** 0.003 
Share of boys 0.011*** 0.003 
Share of girls 0.010*** 0.003 
Share of infants 0.012*** 0.004 
Acreage of irrigated land 0.003 0.005 
Value of land owned -0.022*** 0.004 
No. of bullocks owned 0.032 0.028 
Holder of ration card 0.083 0.058 
Literacy of father of household head 0.022 0.053 
Literacy of mother of household head -0.120 0.232 
Literacy of father of household head’s spouse 0.023 0.051 
Literacy of mother of household head’s spouse -0.168 0.178 
Age difference among parents of household head -0.008 0.006 
Age difference among parents of household head’s spouse -0.001 0.006 
Scheduled Castes 0.152** 0.062 
Scheduled Tribes 0.282* 0.163 
Upper and medium Hindu castes 0.192 0.156 
Muslim 0.372*** 0.103 
No. of observations 660 
R2 0.2795 
F 9.56 
 
Notes: (1) Village dummies are also included but suppressed in the table.  
      (2) The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
